the object. This bold proposal leads on to a re-evaluation of Mohan Matthen's (2005) work on pictures and deixis, in a fascinating and original discussion deeply informed by cognitive science.
Moving on to those chapters that focus on the experience of pictures, John H. Brown argues that the literature on depiction has not paid enough attention to what are usually considered 'unauthorized' experiences of pictures. In the case of a sketch, for instance, this could be an experience of the subject as being constituted of (rather than merely depicted by) cross-hatched marks. Brown's superb exploration of a wide range of such perceptions enriches our understanding of a neglected dimension of pictorial experience, but his claims that these should be considered part of the authorized interpretation of pictures will be more contentious.
Richard Wollheim (1987) called seeing-in -an experience that seems to characterize much picture perception -'twofold', since it involves having a visual awareness of the three-dimensional depicted subject and simultaneously being aware of the flat picture surface that depicts it. Two chapters propose to explain twofoldness. John Dilworth holds that twofoldness is not so strange as it might at first seem, since ordinary perception has, on his analysis, a comparable structure. This is an appealing idea, but whether Dilworth's 'double content' account of perception gives the right approach will be a matter of dispute. One disputant will be Bantinaki, whose chapter gives an alternative account of twofoldness. Drawing on Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of matter and form, she argues that the ordinary visual perception of matter and form as united in objects is akin to the twofold experience of (say) paint and the subject matter it depicts. To my mind, Bantinaki's lucid account seems better to illuminate not Wollheimian seeing-in, but the kind of pictorial experience Robert Hopkins draws attention to in his paper: inflected pictorial experience, which, as Hopkins argues, may not be twofold at all. Inflection occurs when, in viewing a picture, we experience its subject matter as having 'inflected properties', that is, properties 'a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface's design (conceived as such)' (158). For instance, this might involve seeing the subject of a heavily impasted Rembrandt as having some of the textural properties of the paint. Inflection was first discussed by Michael Podro (1998) and has more recently received attention from Lopes (2005) ; but it is this excellent paper of Hopkins that seems most likely to bring it to the forefront of attention of writers on depiction. This is not least because Hopkins casts substantial doubt on whether inflected pictorial experience is twofold (and therefore whether it is a species of seeing-in). Nanay's chapter takes up Hopkins's challenge, arguing that Hopkins is wrong to doubt that inflected pictorial experience is twofold. But the greater part of his chapter develops the work of Podro and Lopes in a different way, arguing that the differences between inflected and non-inflected pictorial experience can be understood using a bold account of seeing-in (Nanay 1998) that, like Lopes's essay, draws on ideas from Matthen's (2005) work.
This collection gives an excellent picture of work at the forefront of a vibrant area of analytic philosophy. It also plays an important role in developing existing debates, especially around pictorial experience, and as such is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in the philosophy of pictures. The cover design, featuring Roy Lichtenstein's Magnifying Glass (1963), also marks this out as the best-looking book on depiction -a not inconsequential virtue, at least so long as depiction remains a sub-discipline of aesthetics. 
